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Quest for Unitary Status: The East Baton Rouge
Parish School Desegregation Case

This scarecrowofa suit has, in courseoftime, become so
complicatedthatno man aliveknows what it means. The
partiesto it understandit least ....

The fog of confusion created by the school desegregation case in
East Baton Rouge Parish has loomed over the school system for more
than forty-five years. In this modem-day Jarndycev. Jarndyce,2 the
battle between the private citizens ofEast Baton Rouge Parish and the
School Board has continued to draw media attention as the parties
"duke it out" in the federal court system to rectify the injustices of
past and present discrimination within the school system. Although
the case has remained very active on the docket ofthe District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana during this time, little progress
has been made in restoring the school system to the control of local

authority.
Since the inception of school desegregation in the 1950s, the
United States Supreme Court has continued to manifest a desire for
schools to be returned to the control of local authorities, but the
Supreme Court has been slow to enumerate legal standards necessary
for the termination of'judicial control. However, in the past decade,
the fog has begun to lift as the Court has gradually revealed what is

required for a school system to be released from judicial control and

granted unitary status.
This note will show that the East Baton Rouge Parish School
System is ready to be released from the control of the district court.
Part I lays out the facts and history of the East Baton Rouge Parish
school desegregation case. Part II provides a history of the federal
court's role in school desegregation. In Part III the concept ofunitary
status as established by the United States Supreme Court is discussed,
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. Charles Dickens, Bleak House 4 (Bantam Books 1992) (1853).
2. Id. According to Dickens, this case originated before the close of the
eighteenth century and, in 1853 when Bleak Housewas published, had not yet been
resolved. Also, "more than double the amount of seventy thousand pounds ha[d]
been swallowed up in costs." Id. at xxvi. This is analogous to the East Baton
Rouge Parish desegregation case as it has perpetuated for almost halfa century and
cumulated millions of dollars in legal fees.
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as well as the evolution of the standards established by the Court for
determining whether a school system should bereleased from judicial
control. Part IV reviews the recent trend in the United States circuit
courts of relaxing the application of these standards, indicating the
courts' growing interest in returning schools to local control. Finally,
Part V examines the application ofthese standards to the East Baton
Rouge Parish desegregation case including what evidence the school
board will need to bring forth in order to finally be granted unitary
status and freed from the control of the U.S. District Court.

I. THE FOG SETS IN: DA VIS v.EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SCHOOL
BOARD

The East Baton Rouge Parish school desegregation case3 was
filed in 1956 in response to the United States Supreme Court decision
in Brown v. BoardofEducation.4 In 1960, the Federal District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana issued an order prohibiting the
East Baton Rouge School Board from continuing to operate a racially
segregated school system.5 Upon order ofthe court, the school board
submitted a "freedom ofchoice" desegregation plan that was adopted
by the court in 1963.6 The plaintiffs to the litigation appealed the
plan's approval, and the decision was reversed at the appellate level. 7
In 1969, Dr. D'Orsay Bryant and Mr. Alphonso 0. Potter, active
officers within the National Association for the Advancement of
3.

Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 570 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir.

1978).
4. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
5. Citizens Task Force on Education Improvement, OurKids... OurFuture:
A Community Proposalto Return E.B.R. Public Schools Back to the Community,
at
and
History,
Background
http://www.ourkidsourfuture.org/background/background.html, (last visited Sept.

13, 2001).
6. Id. According to the "freedom of choice" plan, all students had the right
to attend the school of his or her choice, subject to reasonable restrictions and
limitations. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Sch. Bd., 219 F. Supp. 876, 881 (E.D. La.
1963). Transfer requests were to be filed with the school superintendent, and such
transfers were to be liberally granted with no request denial being based on race or
color. In making determinations as to granting or denying requests, the
superintendent was allowed to consider such factors as the desire ofthe student and
legal guardian, availability ofspace in the school requested for transfer, scholastic
ability and achievement of the student, the student's age, etc. The plan gave the
superintendent broad discretion in making decisions regarding requested transfers.
Davis, 219 F. Supp. at 882.
7.

Supranote 5.
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Colored People (theNAACP), were allowed to intervene as plaintiffs.'
In their motion to intervene, they alleged that the interests of local
black children were not being properly represented.9
In 1970, the school board established a biracial committee to
formulate a plan addressing the problems of student and faculty
desegregation. The committee proposed a "neighborhood zoning"
desegregation plan that was unanimously approved by the board and
subsequently adopted by the district court." The plan provided for
desegregation offaculty, staff,transportation, extracurricular activities,
student body composition, and school facilities. Also, in the 1970 plan,
"[s]tudent assignment was based primarily on the neighborhood school
concept," supplemented by a majority-to-minority (MTM)" transfer
provision.' 2 This plan for desegregation was later struck down as
ineffective and, in 1981, another plan devised by the court was
system
implemented in an attempt to "dismantle the dual educational
'root and branch' as required by the Constitution."' 3 During the next
decade, dozens oforders were approved by the court to modify aspects
of the 1981 plan, but the basic principles of the plan remained
unchanged throughout the 1980s. In 1990, the school system began,
experiencing serious overcrowding problems, and the school board'
commenced looking for a solution to the problems of overcrowding
without distorting its primary objective ofdesegregation. 4
By the end ofthe 1995-1996 school year, the 1981 plan had failed
to dismantle the dual school system." Thus, in 1996, the Board
proposed a new plan

8. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 570 F.2d 1260, 1261 (5th Cir.

1978).
9, Id.
10. See supranote 4.

11. A majority to minority (MTM) transfer is a tool used by the school district
to assist it in meeting its obligations to become desegregated by allowing students
who are presently attending school where they are in the racial majority to request
transfers to schools where they are in the racial minority. Since its implementation
in 1996, MTM transfers have almost tripled to more than 1700 transfer requests in

the fall of the 2001-2002 school year. Charles Lussier, EBR Schools See Drop in
Transfer Requests, The Advocate (Baton Rouge), Dec. 24, 2001, available at

http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StorylD-26789.
12.
13.

Intervenor Pl. Br. (May 25, 2001) citing Davis, 570 F.2d. at 1262.
Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 514 F. Supp. 869, 871 (M.D.

La. 1981).
14. See supra note 5.
15. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., Transcript, R. Vol. 3, at 554-
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designed to raise and equalize the level of quality of the
educational experience provided to the students attending the
East Baton Rouge Parish Public School System, reduce the
number ofracially identifiable schools, stabilize and increase
the number of students in the system, increase the number of
students enrolled in desegregated schools, and increase
interracial exposure among students. 6
On August 2, 1996, the district court approved this Consent Decree
after both the Board and the plaintiffs agreed to the provisions of the
new plan. 7 Although relatively brief, the new plan contained eight
major provisions, including provisions addressing community
sensitive attendance zones, faculty enhancement of "raciallyidentifiable" black schools, and facility enhancements at "raciallyidentifiable" schools.' 8 Since its implementation in 1996, numerous
disputes have arisen regarding the interpretation and modification of
the 1996 Consent Decree. Although the case has seen much activity,
no explicit attention has been given to the termination of the
desegregation case; instead, the parties continue to focus almost
exclusively on procedural and remedial issues.' 9
On July 25, 2001, Judge John Parker, United States District Judge
for the Middle District of Louisiana, resigned from the East Baton
Rouge desegregation case."° Judge Parker, who had presided over the
case for twenty-two years, expressed his dissatisfaction with the
case's progress and the school board's lack of effort to comply with
the 1996 Consent Decree. After Judge Parker stepped down, the case
was assigned to United States District Judge James Brady, a recent
addition to the federal bench.2' Although Judge Brady has only been
16. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., Transcript, R. Vol. 1,at 225.
17. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., Transcript, R. Vol. 1,at 22627.
18. A desegregated school is defined in the 1996 Consent Decree as one whose
student population is within 15 percentage points of the school system's racial
makeup for each age group (elementary, middle school, and high school). If the
student population falls outside the confines of this requirement, that school is
defined as a "racially identifiable" school. Charles Lussier, DesegregationTool
Blunted, The Advocate (Baton Rouge), Oct. 3, 2001, available at
http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StoryID=24985 (hereinafter
DesegregationTool).
19. Wendy Parker, The Futureof School Desegregation,94 Nw.,U. L. Rev.
1157, 1190 (2000).
20. Notice to Counsel, Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd. (M.D. La.

2001).
21. Charles Lussier, JudgeParkerFinallyHasEnough,The Advocate (Baton
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involved with the case for a few months, he has indicated a desire to
work with the parties to devise a solution to the desegregation
problems in the parish. In an effort to ensure progression ofthe case,
Judge Brady has set up informal meetings with the School Board, the
original .1956 plaintiffs, the local NAACP, the U.S. Justice
Department, as well as representatives from the Citizen's Task Force
on Education Improvements22 to discuss the objectives of each party
to the case and to notify the parties of his expectations of the
respective parties as the case continues.23
As is evidenced by the most recent pronouncement of the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the School Board's
appeal of a decision calling for the inclusion of pre-kindergarten
students in school enrollment limits, the court has grown impatient
with the perpetuity ofthe case and desires its expeditious resolution.
As Judge King, Chief Judge of the United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, so eloquently stated during oral arguments for the recent
appeal, "[w]e can't micromanage this case."2 However, the Fifth
Circuit panel was also quick to point out that the responsibility for
judicial supervision lay with the district court, not with the appellate
court; and the district judge's rulings were to be given substantial
weight upon review at the appellate level.
The Fifth Circuit also suggested that since Judge Brady is now
presiding over the case, the parties might benefit from the possibility
ofhis interpreting the duties of the School Board to desegregate in a
different manner than Judge Parker had previously. Because
desegregation jurisprudence is so broad, it allows the presiding judge
much discretion in interpreting the standards as he or she personally
sees fit for declaring unitary status. After all, "judicial choice is
inescapable... 'There is no guarantee ofjustice except the personality
Rouge),

July

26,

2001,

available

at

http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StorylD=24985.
22. The Citizens Task Force on Education Improvement was allowed to
intervene in the desegregation suit on Mar. 1,2000 as an amicus. The task force's
primary objective is to come up with a plan for resolution ofthe East Baton Rouge
school desegregation case, "deliver[ing] the public school system from Court

See supra note 5, at
control and back to the community."
Sept.
13, 2001).
(last
visited
http://www.ourkidsourfuture.org.html
23. Charles Lussier, Brady Calls DesegregationMeetings, The Advocate
(Baton

Rouge),

Nov.

1,

2001,

available

at

http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StoryID=25640.
24. Joe Gyan, Jr., EBR Board'sAppeal Heard,The Advocate (Baton Rouge),

1,
available
200
8,
Sept.
http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StorylD=24309.

at
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of the judge."' 25 Based on this potential for Judge Brady to be more
sympathetic to the School Board's cause as well as the imminence and
necessity of ending the federal court's supervision, the school board
must take affirmative steps to acquire unitary status. The time has
come for the East Baton Rouge desegregation case to reach a point of
finality.
II. HISTORY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
In the landmark decision, Brown I, the Supreme Court held that
racial segregation of public schools violates the Equal Protection
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.26 In its decision, the Court held
that "in the field ofpublic education the doctrine of'separate but equal'
'
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."27
Although the Court established this fundamental principle that racial
discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, the Court failed
to provide any guidance as to how states should remedy the problem.
It was not until one year later in Brown IIthat the Court considered the
manner in which relief was to be accorded.28 In Brown II, the Court
ordered schools to desegregate "with all deliberate speed," and called
upon the district courts to supervise the implementation ofits decree.29
These district courts were authorized to take measures necessary for
and consistent with the ultimate goal of desegregation.
Although Brown II established who was in charge of supervising
the desegregation process, the Court's decision left much uncertainty
as to how the desegregation cases should be handled and exactly what
should be required in order for such cases to be resolved. It was not
until 1991 when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
BoardofEducationofOklahoma CityPublicSchoolsv. Dowell3 that
the Court began to make clear how desegregation cases should be
concluded.3'
25. Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours
Mirabeau, 59 La. L. Rev. 647, 650 (1999) (citing Eugen Ehrlich, Freie
Rechtsfmdung und Freie Rechtswissenchaft (Leipsig 1903)).
26. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
27. Id. at 495, 74 S. Ct. at 692.
28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan. (BrownII), 349 U.S. 294,75 S. Ct.
753 (1955).
29. 349 U.S. at 301, 75 S.Ct. at 757.
30. 498 U.S. 237, 111 S.Ct. 630 (1991).

31. Daniel J. McMullen & Irene Hirata McCullen, Stubborn Facts of
History-The Vestiges ofPastDiscriminationin SchoolDesegregationCases, 44
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 75, 78 (1993).
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III. THE CONCEPT OF UNITARY STATUS

The ultimate objective of any desegregation order is to restore a
school system operating in constitutional compliance to the control
of state and local authorities. It was not until the 1990s, however,
that the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of terminating
desegregation litigation with its decisions in three cases.32 Taken
together, these three cases clearly indicated "the Supreme Court's
frustration with the long pendency ofschool desegregation litigation,
but not with the inefficacy of court-ordered remedies." 33
In Dowell, the Court emphasized that judicial supervision by the
District Courts was intended only as a temporary arrangement and
was not to operate in perpetuity." The Court established three steps
necessary for a school system to prove unitary status: (1) compliance
in good faith with the applicable desegregation decree since it was
entered; (2) elimination of vestiges of past discrimination to the
extent practicable; and (3) demonstration of commitment to future
compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment that the school system
"would [not] return to its former ways. ' 35 In devising this three-part
test, the Court emphasized the temporary nature of school
desegregation remedies and the importance ofreturning control to the
test was
authority of local school boards. 36 Once the three-part
37
satisfied, control should be returned to local authority.
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court again stressed its
frustration with the longevity of school desegregation cases. 38 Here,
the Court reaffirmed the three-part Dowell test and even went so far
as to adopt the concept ofpartial unitary status.3 9 This incremental
concept allows the court to release one part ofa school district that is
considered unitary from its active supervision and retain jurisdiction
32. Parker, supra note 19, at 1163. The cases included Bd.. of Educ. of Okla.
Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); and Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 S. Ct.
2038 (1995).
33. Parker, supranote 19, at 1163.
34. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111 S. Ct.
630 (1991).
35. Parker, supranote 19, at 1163 (quotingDowell,498 U.S. at 247, 111 S. Ct.
at 637).
36. Parker, supra note 19, at 1165.
37. Id. at 1164-65.
38. 503 U.S. 467, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
39. Id. at 488-89, 112 S. Ct. at 1444-45.
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over another part that is not in compliance with unitary standards.'
In determining whether the school system had achieved unitary
status, the court analyzed the factors it had previously set out in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia."'
Under Green, a court must confront the question of whether the
school system was unitary by undertaking a fact-sensitive inquiry
with respect to six factors: student assignments, faculty assignments,
staff assignments, transportation, extra-curricular activities, and
facilities. " In Freeman, the Court found that the school board had
achieved a unitary system with regard to student assignments,
transportation, physical facilities, and extra-curricular activities; but
held the school district was not unitary in every respect.43 Vestiges
of the dual system still remained in the areas of teacher and principal
assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education." The
Court recognized that the critical beginning point in addressing the
degree of compliance with a school desegregation decree is the
degree of racial imbalance within the school district itself.45 In
addition to an assessment of current racial mix within the school
district, an explanation for the racial imbalance was considered vital
to the Court's analysis.' The Court recognized dramatic changes in
the racial composition of the county since the inception of the
desegregation decree as well as a striking change in the racial
proportions of the student population.47 After analyzing the
significant fluctuations in racial composition, the Court held that
proof of demographic changes following a brief period of
desegregation could preclude a determination that the school system

40. Id. at 490-91, 112 S. Ct. at 1445-46.
41. 391 U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689 (1968). In Green, the Court held that the
adoption of a freedom of choice plan alone did not satisfy a school district's
mandatory responsibility to eliminate all vestiges of a dual system. Instead, school
districts have an affirmative duty to come forward with a plan that "promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at 439, 88 S. Ct.
at 1694 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 435, 88 S. Ct. at 1693.
43. 503 U.S. at 471, 112 S. Ct. at 1436.
44. Id. at 474, 112 S. Ct. at 1437.
45. Id..
46. Id. at 474-76, 112 S. Ct. at 1437-38.
47. The school system that the District Court had desegregated in 1969 had a
5.6 percent composition of black students; by 1986, the percentage of black
students in the county school system had risen to 47 percent. Id. at 475, 112 S. Ct.
at 1438.
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is responsible for present segregation.48 In essence, the Court held
that demographic factors effectively rebutted the presumption that
racial imbalances were caused by dejure segregation policies of the
school system. 49 The Court expressed its acceptance that defacto
segregation was a natural consequence ofprivate American behavior
and not the result of discriminatory vestiges within the school
systems.50 Once the racial imbalance caused by the dejureviolation
has been remedied, the school district is under no duty to remedy
imbalances caused by demographic factors. 5 The Court recognized
that attempts to remedy results ofdemographic shifts would result in
simply because
never-ending judicial supervision of school districts
52
segregation.
dejure
of
guilty
once
they were
The FreemanCourt also introduced the concept ofpartial unitary
status and indicated its acceptance of it by saying that the courts' use
of equitable discretion is vital to the resolution of desegregation
cases. 3 By adopting the partial unitary status approach, "a district
court can concentrate both its own resources and those ofthe school
district on the areas where the effects of dejurediscrimination have
not been eliminated and further action is necessary in order to provide
real and tangible relief to minority students. 54
InMissouriv.Jenkins,the Court continued its development ofthe
standards for granting unitary status." As the Court had done in
Freeman, it again focused on proximate cause as a limit on a
defendant's desegregation obligation. But, inJenkins,the Court went
even further. Instead of reciting the causation presumptions and
noting their potential limits, the Court ignored the presumptions
altogether and imposed an "incremental effect" standard to the issue
ofcausation.5 6 Under this standard, the school board may argue that
current vestiges of discrimination are not caused by the action or
inaction of the school board, but by private forces.57 Taken together,
the incremental effect standard and the presumptions give defendant
school boards the opportunity, potentially, to excuse current disparities
48. Freeman,503 U.S. at 479-80, 112 S. Ct. at 1439-40.
49. Parker, supranote 19, at 1170.
50. Id. at 1171.
51. Freeman,503 U.S. at494, 112 S. Ct. at 1447 (citing Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1283-84 (1971)).
52. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495, 112 S. Ct. at 1448.
53. Id. at 489, 112 S. Ct. at 1445.

54. Id. at 493, 112 S. Ct. at 1447.
55. 515 U.S. 70, 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995).
56. Parker, supranote 19, at 1172.
57. Id.
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by arguing that such disparity is not caused by the defendant, but "by
demographics, socioeconomic status, and similar factors."58 The Court
held that the ultimate issue in partially dissolving judicial
supervision was "'whether the [constitutional violator] ha[s]
complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered, and whether the vestiges ofpast discrimination ha[ve] been
eliminated to the extent practicable."' 59
Related to the incremental effects standard was the Court's
progressively growing acceptance ofdefacto segregation. Since its
decision in Dowell, the Court has gradually begun to show its
acceptance ofracial segregation as a "natural consequence ofpurely
private behavior."' Jenkins reflects the Court's recognition of a
reality in today's society that there exist racial disparities caused
entirely by activities outside the scope and control of the school
board. The Court seems to be indicating that its primary purpose is
not to eradicate segregation, but to provide the victims of
discrimination with effective remedies.6 '
This line of decisions demonstrates that school districts still
must prove the absence of continuing vestiges of past
discrimination, but the burden is greatly alleviated by the Court's
focus on local control and its acceptance of continued segregation
or immediate resegregation.62 Put another way, the need to end the
judicial responsibility of supervising the actions of the school
districts outweighs the significance of remaining vestiges of
segregation in the school systems.
IV. THE FOG THINS IN THE CIRCUITS
There has been an increasing tendency in the federal appellate
courts to affirm district court rulings of unitary status in order to
uphold the goal set out by the Supreme Court of returning school
systems to the control of local and state authorities. In the brief span
of time between March and October 2001, the Eleventh, Seventh,
and Fourth Circuits each expressed their rising approval of
declaring school systems unitary, evidencing the increasing
reluctancy of courts to retain supervision if good faith efforts have
been made by the respective school boards to eliminate the vestiges
of a dual system.
58. Id.
59. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 89, 115 S.Ct. at 2049 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at
249-50, 111 S.Ct. at 638).

60. Parker, supra note 19, at 1177.
61.

Id.

62. Id. at 1178.
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A. Eleventh Circuit'sApproach:Manning v. School Board of
Hillsborough County, Fla.63
In March 2001, the Eleventh Circuit took the federal
jurisprudence promulgated in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins and
applied it to dissolve a desegregation decree in Manning,the oldest
active case on the docket of the Middle District of Florida." The
court held that demographic shifts were a significant reason for racial
imbalances in the school system, and such imbalances were inevitable
despite the school board's good-faith effort to eliminate such vestiges
of past discrimination. 5 Therefore, the court found that the school
board had overcome the presumption that racial imbalances were the
result of dejure segregation, and the school system was deemed to
have achieved unitary status."
The Manningplaintiffs filed a class action suit in 1958 on behalf
of all "minor Negro children and their parents" residing in the
Hillsborough County School District.67 In 1962, the district court
found that the school board was operating a segregated school system
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Over the next thirty
years, the school system remained under the district court's judicial
authority, with the most recent desegregation plan accepted by the
parties and the court in 1991. In 1994, the plaintiffs moved to
enforce the 1991 Consent Order which called for the elimination of
single grade centers and the establishment of middle schools. The
district judge deferred ruling on the motion and sua sponte
recommitted the matter to the magistrate judge for consideration of
whether the school district had become unitary, thereby eliminating
the need for judicial oversight. 69
In August 1997, the magistrate judge issued a report in which she
opined that the school system had achieved unitary status, basing her
findings on the application of the six Green factors. In addition,
quality of education, a seventh ancillary factor previously examined
by other courts in similar cases, was considered.70 The magistrate
judge also made factual findings regarding the defendant's good-faith
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

244 F.3d 927 (11th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Manning,244 F.3d at 945.
Id. at 947.
Id.at 929.
Id.
Manning,244 F.3d at 930.
Id. at 934.
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compliance with past desegregation decrees. Based on her findings,
she recommended that the district court release the school system
from its supervision.
After considering the magistrate's findings and recommendations,
the district judge concluded that the school system had not achieved
unitary status.7 I For six of the seven factors examined by the
magistrate judge, the district judge adopted most, if not all, of
magistrate's findings. However, with regard to student assignments,
the district judge expressed disagreement with the magistrate's
recommendation. Additionally, the districtjudge was skeptical ofthe
school board's good-faith compliance efforts.
The critical issue in this case was whether the racial imbalances
in county public schools were caused by the school board's past de
jure segregation or, alternatively, whether the imbalances were
caused by nondiscriminatory facts and circumstances." Expert
testimony was presented that the current racial imbalances were
caused, not by the school board's actions, but rather by shifts in
demographics. Based on such expert testimony, the district judge
determined there existed no indication that the racial identity ofthe
schools had been deliberately caused by the segregative practices of
the school board and "'based on the totality ofthe evidence, a shift in
demographics [was] a substantial cause of the racial identifiability in
Hillsborough County's schools."' 73 However, she still declined to
grant the school system unitary status because she could not conclude
that the demographic shifts were the sole cause of the racial
imbalances.7 4 Furthermore, the district judge refused to find the
school board's action to be in good-faith compliance with the
desegregation decree.75 The judge faulted the defendant for not
"utiliz[ing] the available techniques [to desegregate] to the maximum
extent practicable" and for not demonstrating a willingness to
aggressively desegregate the school district to the maximum extent
practicable.716
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that in determining
whether the vestiges of discrimination have been eliminated to the
extent practicable, the court must examine the six areas of school
operation established in Green." Furthermore, the court specifically
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Manning,244 F.3d at 930.
Manning,244 F.3d at 936.
Id. at 936 (citing Manning,24 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 1998)).
Manning,24 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
Manning,244 F.3d at 938-39.
Manning,24 F.Supp.2d at 1312, 1335.
391 U.S. 430,435, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1693 (1968). These factors are student
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endorsed the statement in Jenkins that "a school board has no
obligation to remedy racial imbalances caused by external factors,
such as demographic shifts, which are not the result of segregation
In addition, the court
and are beyond the board's control." T
emphasized that returning schools to local control at the earliest date
possible is "essential to restor[ing] their true accountability in our
governmental system . . . [w]here control lies, so too does
responsibility."7
Traditionally, once a plaintiff proves de jure segregation, a
presumption arises that all racial imbalances within a school district
are the result of such de jure segregation. However, citing its
previous decision in Lockett v. Board of Education of Muscogee
County School District,Georgia(Lockett II),' the court contended
that a school board can rebut the presumption that racial imbalances
are constitutionally violative. This presumption can be rebutted when
the school board shows that some external force, which is not the
result of past or present discrimination on its part and is beyond its
control, substantially caused the racial imbalances. 8' Where a school
board shows that demographic shifts are a substantial cause of the
assignments, faculty assignments, staffassignments, transportation, extra-curricular
activities, and facilities.
78. Manning,244 F.3d at 941 (citing Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 102, 115 S. Ct. at
2055-56.
79. Id. at 942 n.25 (citing Freeman,503 U.S. at 490, 112 S. Ct. at 1445).
80. 111 F.3 839 (11 th Cir. 1997). In Lockett II, black public school students
had obtained an injunction prohibiting the school board from operating a
segregated school system. When the students sought an injunction to force the
board's compliance, the case went before the district court for consideration on the
merits. The district court granted the school board's motion for declaration of
unitary status. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals limited its
discussion of the Green factors to student assignments since the parties to the case
stipulated to the school system's eliminating the vestiges of dejure segregation
with regard to the other five Green factors. The court relied on expert testimony
that racial imbalances were the result of dramatic demographic changes in
Muscogee County, such as an increase in the number to black students and a
decrease in the number of white students, a decrease in white fertility rates, a
difference in purchasing power between white and black families, a preference of
white and black families to live in neighborhoods primarily composed of families
of the same race, and the location ofhousing projects. Based on this evidence, the
court concluded that racial imbalances were "the result of voluntary housing
patterns and demographic change," and therefore, not a vestige of the previously
dual system. Id. at 843.
81. Id. at 843.
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racial imbalances, that school board can overcome the presumption
of de jure segregation." Thus, the law does not require a school
board to eliminate the vestiges ofpast discrimination to the maximum
extent practicable; it merely requires that vestiges of past
discrimination be eliminated "to the extent practicable." 3
The district judge in Manningerred in holding the school board
to a higher standard than the law requires; the school board was only
obligated to prove that racial imbalances were not the result of
present or past discrimination on its part. In this case, the school
board's expert evidence and testimony showing the imbalances to be
the result ofvoluntary housing patterns and demographic shifts were
sufficient to overcome the presumption, so the school system was
deemed unitary.84 The plaintiff could not undermine the strength of
the school board's demographic evidence by merely asserting that
demographics alonedid not explain the racial imbalances.8 5 Once the
defendant establishes a rebuttal, the plaintiff must show that the
demographic shifts are the result ofprior dejuresegregation or some
discriminatory conduct in order to preserve the presumption of de
jure segregation.86
Another important point made by the court in Manningconcerns
the district judge's failure to provide the school board with
clarification of what specific steps should be taken by the school
board to desegregate "to the maximum extent practicable."87
Although the court acknowledges thatthe standard "maximum extent
practicable" is an incorrect standard, the court duly recognizes the
duty of the district judge, upon request, to provide the school board
with a "precise statement" of its obligation under a consent decree.88
Therefore, when a school board's motion to be declared unitary is
denied by the district court and the defendants request a reason for the
denial, the district judge has an obligation to provide specific
guidance to the school board as to what steps must be taken in order
for the system to achieve unitary status.89
The court also addressed the district judge's finding that the
school board had not made a good-faith effort to comply with past
82. Manning,244 F.3d at 945.

83. Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 842 (emphasis added).
84. Manning,244 F.3d at 945.

85. Id. at 944-945.
86. Id. at 944-945.
87. Manning,28 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1355 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
88. Manning, 244 F.3d at 943 citing Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101, 115 S. Ct. at

2055.
89. Id. at 943, n.26.
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federal desegregation decrees. The district judge pinpointed two
areas ofconcern that precluded her finding the school board to be in
good faith: the school board's apathy and lack ofa functioning MTM
program. Again, the appellate court found that the district judge had
applied an erroneous legal standard, stating, "[t]he law does not
require a defendant school board to take every conceivable step in
attempting to desegregate." 90 Thus, the defendant's lack of a
functioning MTM program does not necessarily preclude a finding of
good faith compliance. As explained by the court in Lockett II, in
determining if a school board has acted in good faith compliance, a
court should not dwell on isolated discrepancies, but rather should
"consider whether the school board's policies form a consistent
pattern oflawful conduct directed to eliminating earlier violations."',
The Manningcourt found that the magistrate judge had been correct
in her finding that a school board's affirmative duty to desegregate
did not require adoption of the most desegregative alternative
available.
Based on these findings, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Hillsborough County school system had indeed achieved unitary
status. The case was remanded to the district court for its declaration
of the school system as unitary, thereby terminating the judicial
supervision ofthe school system. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Manninghas yet to be overruled.92
B. Seventh Circuit'sApproach: People Who Care v. Rockford
Board of Education93
Approximately one month after the Manning decision, the
Seventh Circuit cited Manningin its decision, People Who Care v.
RockfordBoardofEducation. In acknowledging that the board had
no legal duty to remove vestiges of societal discrimination for which
it was not responsible, the court recognized that factors other than
discrimination had contributed to the unequal educational attainment
within the school system." These factors included, but were not
90. Id. at 945 (citing Freeman,503 U.S. at493, 112 S. Ct. at 1447). Freeman

expressly rejected the premise that "heroic measure must be taken to ensure racial
balance."
91. Manning,244 F.3d at 946 (citing Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 843).
92. Also, the United States Supreme Court denied the petitioner's writ of
certiorari Oct. 1,2001.
93.

246 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 2001).

94. Id.
95. Id. at 1075-1076.
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limited to, poverty; parental education and employment; family size;
parental attitudes and behavior; prenatal, neonatal, and child health
care; peer-group pressures; and ethnic culture. The court recognized
that the influence of some ofthese factors may have been caused by
or "exacerbated by discrimination," but such discrimination was not
committed specifically by the defendant school board.96 Also, in
considering the length of the litigation,97 the scale of the
expenditures,9" and the level of desegregation achievement by the
school system,99 there was compelling evidence to end the court's
supervision over the school system, rather than merely modify it as
urged by the plaintiffs."°
C. Fourth Circuit'sApproach: Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board ofEducation ° '
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) had operated under a
federally supervised desegregation plan since 1971. This plan included
limited use ofracial ratios, pairing and grouping of school zones, and
extensive busing. The implementation of the 1971 plan was so
successful that the district court removed it from its active docket in
1975, expressing its belief that the school board was committed to
achieving desegregation and well on its way to achieving unitary status.
Nearly three decades later, however, CMS remained under judicial
supervision. It was not until 1997 when a lawsuit was filed by a white
student challenging the constitutionality of the magnet school
admissions policy that the Fourth Circuit was prompted to determine
the validity ofthe district court holding CMS worthy ofunitary status.
In making its determination, the court applied the.Dowell standard of
whether the Board had "complied in good faith with the desegregation
96. Id. at 1076.

97. The school desegregation litigation had begun years ago and resulted in a
remedial decree in 1973. Since that time, the school system had been subject to the
district court's oversight. Id.at 1074.
98. Through the end of 1999, the taxpayers of Rockford has incurred total
costs of $238 million to comply with the 1996 decree and its predecessors. More
than half ofthat amount had been incurred since 1996. Attorney fees alone were
approaching $20 million. Id. at 1075.
99. As a result ofthe significant expenditures made and Rockford's policy of
allowing parents to choose which public school their children would attend, the
school district had succeeded in desegregating its schools by the end of 1999 when
it filed its motion to dissolve the remedial decree. Id. at 1075.
100.

People Who Care, 246 F.3d at 1075.

101.

269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001).
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decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable."''
Implicit in the court's use ofthe term "practicable" was "a reasonable
limit on the duration of... federal supervision."' ' The Fourth Circuit
applied the six Greenfactors"°4 to the CMS case to determine whether
the district court's account ofthe evidence was plausible in light of all
of the facts and circumstances. 5
In regard to student assignments, the first and perhaps most critical
ofthe Green factors, the district court had adopted a plus/minus fifteen
percent variance standard'06 to determine whether or not a school was
racially balanced. However, if a school fell outside this variance, a
"reasonable and supportable explanation" would suffice to rebut this
presumption ofracial imbalance."° The court found that since 1970,
of the 126 schools in CMS, only thirty-seven schools were racially
imbalanced according to the plus/minus fifteen percent variance
standard for more than three years.08 The court found that racial
imbalances in schools had increased in recent years; however, the court
was satisfied that "demography and geography ha[d] played the largest
role in causing imbalance."". Based on the school board's efforts to
102. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
103. Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Del., 90
F.3d 752, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).
104. See Green, supranotes 41 and 77.
105. Belk, 269 F.3d 305, 318.
106. The standard was a plus/minus fifteen percent variance from the districtwide ratio of black to white students. When schools were outside this variance,
they were considered racially
imbalanced. Id. at 319.
107. Id. (citing Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schs., 57 F. Supp.2d
246 (W.D. N.C. 1999).
108. Id.at 319-20 (citing Capacchione,57 F. Supp.2d at 248). Twenty schools
had black student bodies higher than fifteen percent above the district-wide ratio
for more than three years, and only seventeen schools had black student bodies
lower than fifteen percent below the district average for more than three years.
Additionally, CMS had not operated a single-race school since 1970. Id.
109. Id. at 320 (citing Capacchione,57 F. Supp.2d at 250). Some of the
relevant statistics included the following: (1)the county population had increased
from 354,656 in 1970 to 613,310 in 1997; (2) the racial composition of the county
had changed from seventy-six percent white and twenty-four percent black in 1970
to sixty-eight percent white, twenty-seven percent black, and five percent other in
1997; (3) inner city and nearby suburbs had lost large numbers ofwhite residents
as they spread farther out into the formerly rural sections of the county (white
flight); and (4) the school system's racial composition in 1997 was fifty percent
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racially balance schools coupled with substantial growth and
demographic shifts, the court held that "the present levels ofimbalance
[were] in no way connected with [the] de jure segregation once
practiced in CMS.""'
When faculty assignments were examined, the court found that in
1997-1998 only ten of CMS's 126 schools were imbalancedIII This
small imbalance was insufficient to reject the district court's finding of
unitary status. Examination of the third Green factor, facilities and
resources, manifested inequalities in the adequacy, safety, accessibility,
and appearance of the school facilities in the county. However, these
disparities were found to be "functions of the age of the facilities at
issue because different building standards apply when a new facility is
constructed as compared to when an older facility is renovated" or
expanded."2 The court found no nexus between these disparities and
any intentional racial discrimination by CMS. Additionally, the court
commended CMS for its history of allocating funds in renovating old
facilities on a per-pupil basis, noting that a large portion of its funds
were used to improve schools in predominantly black areas." 3
Next, the court considered issues oftransportation. In 1998, five
out ofsix students in CMS rode abus to school. However, this service
was provided free of charge for all students, regardless of race, who
lived more than one and a half miles from their schools. The court
found no vestiges ofpast discrimination is this area and held that
1 4 the
present state ofbusing "'may be about the best CMS can do."' '
Regarding staff assignments, the fifth Green factor, the court
recognized that no findings ofdiscrimination in school staffing were
ever made. Therefore, the court concluded that CMS had complied
with its constitutional duties regarding staff assignments.
The final Green factor considered was extra-curricular activities.
The evidence presented showed that black and white participation in
extra-curricular activities varied from year to year, but participation
was approximately equal. Disparities that existed in some areas "were
not shown to be linked to the former dual system."" 5
white, forty-two percent black, and eight percent other.

Id. at 320 (citing

Capacchione,57 F. Supp.2d at 236-39).
110. Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
111. Belk, 269 F.3d at 326. The district court had used a plus/minus fifteen
percent variance standard similar to the one used for student assignments. Id.
112. Id. at 327 (citing Capacchione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 265).
113. Id. at 328 (citing Capacchione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 266).
114. Id. at 329 (quoting Capacchione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 253).
115. Id. at 329. Black students often outnumbered white students in holding
elected student government offices while white students were better represented in
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In addition to analyzing the Green factors, the court may, in its
discretion, consider other ancillary factors not mentioned in Green.' 6
The three additional factors the Fourth Circuit chose to consider were
teacher quality, student achievement, and student discipline. In
examining teacher quality, the court found that the experience level
of teachers in primarily white and primarily black schools was
relatively equal, with teachers in imbalanced-white schools only
averaging approximately one year more teaching experience than
those in imbalanced-black schools. Therefore, the court held that
students were receiving equal access to quality teachers in all CMS
schools.
Next, the court considered student achievement. The Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees equal
protection, but not equal outcomes."17 However, if low black student
achievement is the result ofvestiges ofpast or present discrimination
committed by the school system, such disparity must be eliminated
to the extent practicable." 8 However, "[m]ost courts [ ], including
this [one], have declined to consider the achievement gap as a vestige
of discrimination or as evidence ofcurrent discrimination.""..9 Based
on expert testimony, the court held that the true causes of the
The court
achievement gap were socioeconomic factors. 20
recognized that while such startling gaps are disturbing, they are not
the result ofCMS's actions or lack thereof, so they were not the result
of a residual dual system.
In the area of discipline, statistics showed that of the students
disciplined from 1996 to 1998, sixty-six percent were black
students.' However, the court noted that "'disparity does not, by

honors programs. However, there was no evidence that CMS was responsible for
these variances. Id.
116. Id. at319.
117. Id. at 330 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-250, 111 S. Ct. at 638).
118. Id.
119. Belk, 269 F.3d at 330 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 331. Data presented at trial by an expert witness included the
following: (1) A black family's average annual income was $31,000 compared to
$59,000 for white families. (2) Only fifteen percent of black parents had college
degrees while fifty-eight percent of white parents did. (3) CMS provided sixtythree percent of black students with free lunches; only nine percent of white
students received this benefit. (4) Eighty-three percent of white students resided
with both parents in a single residence compared to only forty-two percent ofblack
students. Id.
121. Id. at 332.
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itself, constitute discrimination."'22 CMS had adopted uniform
guidelines for discipline in all of its schools so that students would
receive the same level of punishment for certain offenses; therefore,
the court found that CMS did not treat African-American students
differently in matters of discipline.
Based on its analysis of the Green factors, the court found that
CMS had achieved unitary status. The court recognized that the
school system was not perfect, as it faced expanding student
population, aging facilities, and a limited amount of funding.
However, such difficulties were not found to be "vestiges of the
former de jure system,' 2 3 thus the 1971 decree was dissolved,
returning control to the local authorities.
As is evidenced by these three recent cases, the U.S. circuit courts
are beginning to show an increasing approval ofterminating federal
judicial supervision ofschool systems. The line ofjurisprudence has
significantly progressed from the days of extremely strict
construction of the desegregation jurisprudence in effect in the
1970's. This is clearly indicative of the courts' frustration with the
longevity of school desegregation cases.2 4 The courts seem more
willing to compromise policies of desegregation in order to return
school systems to local control.
V. HAS THE TIME FINALLY COME FOR THE FOG TO
BATON ROUGE PARISH?

LIFT N EAST

Given the recent determinations ofunitary status by other circuit
courts coupled with the Supreme Court's increasing approval of
releasing schools to the control oflocal authorities and its acceptance
of inevitable de facto segregation, the time has come for the East
Baton Rouge Parish School Board to shift its focus from the endless

battle over procedural and remedial issues to the goal of attaining
dissolution of judicial supervision. To accomplish this, the school
system must prove that it has achieved unitary status. Recently, the
School Board has expressed a tenacious interest in putting an end to

the desegregation case making the strategic move of hiring a
prominent Washington, D.C. law firm, Cooper &Kirk, to take over
as lead counsel in the case. In the October 25, 2001 School Board
meeting, Cooper & Kirk partner, Michael Kirk, informed the Board
that based on his analysis of the Board's efforts to comply with the
122. Id. (citing Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d
228, 281 (W.D. N.C. 1999).

123. Belk,269 F. 3d at 335.
124. Parker, supranote 19, at 1175.
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Consent Decree and the change in demographics within East Baton
Rouge Parish, the school system is unitary. Although Kirk reiterated
these sentiments to reporters after the meeting, he emphasized that he
would prefer to have the support ofthe other parties to the suit before
he goes forward to seek a declaration ofunitary status.' 25 Relying on
Kirk's opinion, the School Board voted to seek an immediate end to
the desegregation case but only after discussing it with the other
parties in the case.
This was the Board's first step toward seeking the court's
declaration ofthe system as unitary. The School Board has not sought
declaration of unitary status at any time during the forty-five year
history of the case. One problem likely to be faced by the School
Board is that according to the 1996 Consent Decree entered into by
the School Board and the plaintiffs, the Board is not eligible to vitiate
the decree on its own motion until 2004. However, according to
General Counsel for the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
Maxwell Kees, if the system is indeed unitary, the Board has a
constitutional 6 obligation to seek the termination of judicial
supervision.
At the request of Judge Brady, the Board has temporarily
postponed its plan to file for unitary status. ' Judge Brady has asked
all parties involved to participate in one last round of mediation
All parties agreed to his
before litigating the case in his court.'
request for mediation; however, nothing in the mediation is binding
without a vote of the Board. Anticipating that the mediation may not
solve all the problems ofthe case, Judge Brady did set a trial date, if
necessary, for November 12, 2002.129
According to Kirk, the Board has not only complied with the
requirements of the 1996 Consent Decree but "greatly exceeded"
many of these requisites, especially in the area of teachers, facilities,
125. Charles Lussier, BoardSays It's Time to End Suit,The Advocate (Baton
at
2001,
available
Oct.
26,
Rouge),

http://br.theadvocate.con/news/story.asp?StorylD=25505.
126. Interview with Maxwell Kees, General Counsel East Baton Rouge Parish
School System (Nov. 1, 2001).

127. Charles Lussier, EBR says '96 Deal Exceeded, The Advocate (Baton
Rouge),

Dec.

14,

2001,

available

http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StoryID=26561

at

(hereinafter Deal

Exceeded).
128. Charles Lussier, Sides Mull Last Round of Deseg Talks, The Advocate
6,
2001,
available at
(Baton
Rouge),
Dec.
http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StorylD=26372.

129. Id.
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and technology. 30 The School Board must present evidence ofgoodfaith compliance with the Consent Decree and present other evidence
to show that discrimination has been eliminated to the extent
practicable in the areas such as the ones set out in Green.
A. Student Assignments
First addressing student assignments, the most controversial issue
in the desegregation case, the Board claims to have eliminated the old
system ofblack and white schools and done everything "practicable"
to eliminate segregation, as required by the Consent Decree. Under
the 1996 Decree, the Board had a duty to open and maintain thirtythree magnet schools, advertise these magnet schools, increase their
minority enrollment, and fund this program with a minimum of 5.7
million dollars.' In compliance with these requirements, all thirtythree magnet programs were opened between 1996 and 1999, and
magnet programs were advertised in print, radio, and television
media. 132 Also, minority enrollment was enhanced with revised
curricula and a Scholastic Academic Program. 3 3 Additionally, the
Board greatly exceeded its spending requirements,
34 investing 14
million dollars to date in magnet school programs.
Another requirement of the Consent Decree was the
implementation ofMTM transfers. 35 Also, the Board was required
to aggressively recruit transferees, particularly at racially identifiable
schools. 36 In response to these requirements, the Board took
affirmative steps toward compliance. Since implementation in 1996,
no MTM request has ever been denied." 3 Also, due to advertising
and aggressive recruiting, MTM transfer requests have significantly
130. Supra note 127.
131. East Baton Rouge Parish School System Unitary Status Presentation to the
United States Department of Justice at slide 5 (Nov. 19, 2001) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation, on file with the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
Office) (hereinafter "East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation").
132. Id. at slide 6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. In MTM transfers, students may transfer from schools where they are in
the racial majority to schools where they are in the racial minority. Charles

Lussier, EBR Schools See Drop in Transfer Requests, The Advocate (Baton
Rouge),

Dec.

24,

2001,

available

http://br.theadvocate.connews/story.asp?StoryID=26789.
136. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supra note 131, at slide 7.
137. Id. at slide 8.

at
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increased from 699 requests in 1996 to 1,694 requests for the 20012002 school year. 3
The Decree also called for the elimination of fourteen racially
identifiable schools within three years of the Decree's
implementation. 3 9 Indicative of its good faith efforts, the Board
managed to eliminate eight racially identifiable schools since the
inception of the 1996 Consent Decree leaving the school system with
fifty-six racially-identifiable schools."4 However, there are legitimate
explanations for the school system's failure to comply with this
requirement. First, the Consent Decree was negotiated in part on the
assumption that significant numbers of students would return from
private schools after the Decree's implementation. 4 ' This has not been
the case. As indicated by Chart 1, private school enrollment in East
Baton Rouge Parish has continued to increase since the implementation
ofthe Decree.'42 Second, the Consent Decree assumed that the school
system's enrollment would stabilize.'43 This also has not occurred.
Since the adoption of the Decree, the student attrition rate has
continued to accelerate as evidenced by Chart 2.'" Enrollment in East
Baton Rouge Public Schools has dropped almost 20,000 since its peak
in the 1970's when nearly 70,000 students attended parish public
schools. 45 This decline in enrollment has cost the school system more
than 20 million dollars in state education funding since 1994.'4
The Board does not deny that Baton Rouge public schools are
racially imbalanced, but evidence demonstrates that the imbalance is
138. Id.
139. See Desegregation Tool, supranote 18.
140. Id.
141. East Baton Rouge Parish School System Statement of Compliance with
Consent Decree Requirements 7 (Nov. 19,2001) (presented to the NAACP and the
U.S. Dept. of Justice at Nov. 2001 school board meeting, on file with the East
Baton Rouge School Board Office) (hereinafter "EBR Statement ofCompliance").
142. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation supra note 131, at slide 18. See
also Chart 1of the Appendix.
143. See EBR Statement of Compliance, supra note 141, at slide 7.
144. SeeEast Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supra note 131, at slide 16. See
also Chart 2 of the Appendix.
145. Charles Lussier, EBR Down 1,900 Students,The Advocate (Baton Rouge),
at
available
1,
2 00
2,
Oct.
The school system
http://br.theadvocate.com/news/story.asp?StoryID=24965.
experienced a significant decrease in enrollment from the 2000-2001 school year
to the 2001-2002 year. Enrollment fell from 53,188 in 2000-2001 to 51,258 in
2001-2002.
146. Id.
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largely the product of demographic shifts that have taken place over
the years. The racial composition of East Baton Rouge Parish
schools has dramatically shifted in the last thirty years. As evidenced
by Chart 3, since the late 1970's, the racial makeup of the school
system has shifted from majority white to majority black.' 47 As East
Baton Rouge Parish demographics change each year, a desegregated
school inevitably means a more predominantly black one since
according to the Consent Decree, a desegregated school is one whose
student population is within fifteen percentage points of the school
system's target racial makeup for each age group based on the
demographics ofthe parish's student population each year. 41 These
numbers change annually as the school system's racial
makeup shifts
49
to a more predominately black student population. 1
Another fact that evidences the Board's good faith efforts and its
support for minority children is the fact that the School Board spends
approximately 7500 to 8000 dollars per student annually on inner city
schools, which are principally black, while spending only 3500
dollars per student in suburban schools, which are predominately
non-black.' 50 Although this inequality in student spending seems
absurd, the Board's actions are an attempt to fulfill its obligations
under the Consent Decree. Outside the confines of the Consent
Decree, such action by the School Board would be classified as
invidious reverse discrimination.
Although it is almost inevitable that racial imbalances-will still
exist within the school system, according to Manning,People Who
Care, and Belk, the School Board should be able to rebut the
presumption that the racial imbalances were the product of dejure
147. Id. See also Chart 3 of the Appendix.
148. See DesegregationTool, supranote 18. The school system is divided into
three age groups: elementary, middle school, and high school. For the 2001-2002
school year, the target percentages are as follows:
Elementary

74.5% black

Middle School

72.2% black

High School

61.8% black

So, for example, based on these target percentages, a desegregated elementary

school is one with a black population of at least 59.5 percent but not higher than
89.5 percent. Therefore, a desegregated school is indeed a primarily black school.
Id.
149. Id.
150. Interview with Clayton M. Wilcox, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board
Interim Superintendent, in Baton Rouge, La. (Nov. 1, 2001).
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segregation caused by present and past discrimination within the
school system. In Manning, the court declared the school system
unitary despite the fact that seventeen ofits schools remained racially
identifiable. 5 ' Also, even though the student population in the
county had almost doubled between 1969 and 1996, the percentage
of black students in the school system remained fairly constant at
These demographic shifts were
approximately nineteen percent.'
held sufficient to hold the school board in Manningfree from fault for
the continued segregation in the racially identifiable schools. A
fortiori, the demographic shifts in the East Baton Rouge school
system have been much more dramatic, so the Board's argument that
remaining vestiges of discrimination are not the result of de jure
segregative practices ofthe school system should be accepted by the
court as viable. Additionally, in Manning, the 1971 Order had
directed the establishment and implementation of an MTM
program. ' However, from 1977 to 1996, the School Board did not
54
publicize the program and no MTM transfer request was made.
Contrary to this, the East Baton Rouge School Board has not only
made significant efforts to market its MTM program, but it has
granted every request made, with transfer requests increasing more
than 200 percent from 1996 to 2001. For these reasons, it seems that
the Board has complied with the Consent Decree with regard to
student assignments.
B. Facultyand StaffAssignments
Regarding faculty and staff assignments, the 1996 Consent
Decree required faculty racial balance within a plus/minus fifteen
percent test similar to the one set out for racially identifiable
schools. 55 It requires that no school's faculty have a racial
combination more than fifteen percent removed from the overall
faculty makeup of the entire school district for that level of
education. 5 6 Since implementation ofthe Consent Decree, seventyfive percent of the schools meet this plus/minus fifteen percent
151. Manning v. Sch. Bd. Of Hillsborough County, Fla., 244 F.3d 927, 935
(1 th Cir.), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 61 (2001).
152. Manning v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, Fla., 427
F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1970); Manning v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County,
Fla., 24 F. Supp.2d 1277, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
153. Manning, 244 F.3d at 939.
154. Id.
155. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supranote 131, at slide 9.
156. See EBR Statement of Compliance, supranote 141, at slide 3.
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requirement. 5 7 Most schools are in compliance at the beginning of
each school year due to exhaustive efforts by the school
administrations; however, this less-than-100 percent compliance is
attributed to the tremendous faculty attrition, particularly in racially
identifiable schools that occurs during the first few months of each
school year.5 8 The school system makes great efforts to replace these
lost faculty members, but several factors beyond the school system's
control hamper these efforts."I First, Louisiana suffers from a severe
shortage of certified teachers." Also, state law requires the school
system to hire the most qualified individual available when replacing
these teachers, which often conflicts
with the race-conscious
6
requirements of the Consent Decree.' '
A second mandate of the Consent Decree dealing with faculty
assignments requires racially identifiable black schools to have
faculty-pupil ratios equal to those at other schools within the school
district.62 In response to this requirement, the Board ensures that no
racially identifiable black school has a pupil-teacher ratio higher than
any other public school in East Baton Rouge Parish. 63 As evidenced
by Chart 4, student-teacher ratios are slightly lower in racially
identifiable schools than in predominately white schools at each
educational level.'6 Also, the faculty in racially identifiably black
schools is, on average, more experienced than in other parish
schools. 65 Another fact that evidincing the Board's good faith effort
to comply with the Consent Decree is its use of bonus and stipend
incentive plans to lure faculty to66commit to long-term contracts to
teach at specific parish schools.
A similar situation arose in Belk. There the court also applied a
plus/minus fifteen percent variance test. 67 The court found that not
all schools were in compliance with the standard; 6 however, it found
157. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supranote 13 1, at slide 10.
158. See EBR Statement of Compliance, supranote 141, at slides 3-4.
159. Id. at slide 3.

160. Id. at slide 3-4.
161. Id. at slide 4.
162. Id. at slide 3.
163. Id. at slide 4.
164. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supranote 131, at slide 10. See
also Chart 4 of the Appendix.
165. Id. at slide 10.
166. Id. at slide 4.
167. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 269 F.3d 305, 326 (4th Cir.
2001).
168. In 1997-98, twelve percent of the schools failed to satisfy the requirement.
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the current condition to be a far cry from the former dual system in
which almost no black students had white teachers.' 69 The court's
conclusion that the school system evidenced no predisposition to
assigning black teachers to predominately black schools and white
teachers to predominately white schools was sufficient for a finding
that CMS had met this Green factor.1 70 Based on a totality of the
evidence indicating the Board's good faith efforts to comply with the
Consent Decree requirements regarding faculty assignments and in
light of the holding in Belk, the actions of the Board should be
sufficient to satisfy this second Green factor.
C. Facilities
Another important Green factor addressed in the 1996 Consent
Decree is school facilities. Under the Decree, the Board was required
to make repairs to racially identifiable black schools and seek sources
of income to fund these recurring needs. 17 1 In response to this
demand by the Decree, the Board obtained taxpayer approval of a
somewhat comprehensive tax plan which would allow the school
system to update its facilities) Large portions of this funding was
dedicated to curing the inequalities present in racially identifiable
Today, the facilities at racially identifiable black
black schools.'
in some cases superior, to those at nonschools are comparable and,
174
identifiable black schools.
Also in reference to school facilities, the 1996 Consent Decree
required the School System to appropriate at least 600,000 dollars for
the 1996 through 1999 school years and I million dollars annually
thereafter for facility enhancement. 175 This appropriated funding was
to be expended in accordance with the recommendations of the
facilities monitor. 176 In response to these stipulations, the Board has
budgeted the requisite amounts each year, consistently spending the
money in accordance with the recommendations of Dr. Gordon, the
Id.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
See EBR Statement of Compliance, supra note 141, at slide 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.

175. Id.
176. Id. at slide 2, slide 6. The Consent Decree also required the appointment
of a physical facilities monitor. By court order, Dr. William Gordon was appointed
to this position.
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facilities monitor."' The Board works exceedingly hard to
accommodate the recommendations of Dr. Gordon as it has never
refused to fund any ofhis suggestions for facility enhancement.' 78
The desegregation plan ofthe Consent Decree required the use of
temporary buildings in order to provide adequate teaching stations
79
since the Decree required the lowering ofthe student-teacher ratio.1
However, these temporary buildings were only to be used short-term
for the purpose ofimplementing the changes required by the Consent
Decree regarding student-teacher ratios.' Use ofthe buildings was
subject to strict supervision of the court which required the Board to
make reports to the court certifying where temporary buildings would
be used, that the buildings would further the interests of
desegregation, and that receiver sites would not make use of
emergency teaching stations. '8' Also, the Decree required the Board
to commit to the reduction and eventual elimination ofthe temporary
buildings.'82 In the fifth year of the plan, one third of the temporary
buildings were to be eliminated; after eight years, seventy-five
percent ofthe buildings were to be eliminated. 3 In response to these
stringent requirements by the Decree, the Board has made good faith
efforts to comply. The Board has sought court approval each time it
has wished to move a temporary building to a new location and has
always made all required certifications regarding the new placement
of temporary buildings. 84 The Board also complied with the fifth
year elimination plan of one third of the temporary buildings in use
and submitted a reduction plan to the court which will allow the
school system to achieve the elimination of seventy-five percent of
all temporary buildings within nine years of the adoption of the
decree.'85
In Belk, the court found that the disparities in the area of school
facilities was not attributable to the action or inaction ofthe School
Board. 6 Based on expert testimony, current inequalities in school
facilities "were functions of the age of the facilities [] because
177.

EBR Statement of Compliance, supranote 141, at slide 2.

178. Id.
179. Consent Decree at 6, Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 56-1662A (M.D. La. 1996).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See EBR Statement ofCompliance, supra note 141, at slide 6.
184. Id.
185. Id. The Temporary Building Reduction Plan was approved by the court.
186. Belk, 269 F.3d at 327.
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different building standards apply when [] new facilit[ies] are
constructed as compared to when an older facility is renovated."' S7
The court also considered the school system's track record in
renovating old facilities, noting that "'CMS ha[d] spent a large
portion of its [funding to] improv[e] schools in predominantly black
areas.""' 18 8 Based on these findings, the court held that "any disparity
as to the condition of the facilities [] was not caused by intentional
discrimination by [the School Board], but instead was a [result] ofthe
age of the facilities and the ever-present problem of allocating []
scarce funds."'8 9
The compliance efforts in Belk were similar to those of the East
Baton Rouge Parish School Board. Like CMS, the Board has taken
affirmative steps toward curing disparities in school facilities,
especially in racially identifiable schools. The Board's track record
for complying with Consent Decree requirements regarding facilities
should be sufficient to warrant the Board's satisfaction of the
facilities requirement ofGreen.
D. OtherEvidence ofGood-FaithComplianceEfforts
Stressed by the court in Manningwas the idea first introduced in
Lockett II that in determining whether a school board has acted in
good faith compliance, the court should not dwell on isolated
discrepancies, but rather should consider whether the board's actions
form a consistent pattern of lawful conduct aimed at eliminating the
effects of previous bad acts.'" In addition to the three specific areas
of compliance efforts discussed previously, the Board has continued
to show its dedication and enthusiasm to the cause of desegregating
its schools. In every area of the Consent Decree requiring the
appropriation ofaminimum amount offunding, the School Board has
not only complied, but it has consistently spent more than required in
its effort to comply with desegregation requirements.' 9'
In addition, the Board prides itself on strides made to upgrade
technology in the parish schools. 92 The Consent Decree called for a
detailed accounting of the technology needs of the school system. 93
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 328 (citing Capacchione, 57 F. Supp.2d at 266).
Id. at 328.
Manning, 244 F.3d at 946 (citing Lockett II, 111 F.3d at 843).
See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supra note 131, at slide 12-14.

See also Chart 5 of the Appendix.

192. See Deal Exceeded, supra note 127.
193. See EBR Statement ofCompliance, supra note 141, at slide 25.
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After assessing these needs, the Board was able to develop a longterm plan, now implemented, for meeting these needs. 94 Also, the
Decree required the Board to spend 200,000 dollars in 1996 for
planning, equipping, and training to bring the school system's
technology up to date, especially targeting those schools that have
been historically majority black schools.'95 Since that time, the Board
has allocated 200,000 dollars each year to racially identifiable black
schools to provide for their technological needs.'96 As a result of
these efforts, racially identifiable black schools now have a computer
to student ratio significantly lower than that required by the Consent
Decree.'97
E. Dangers ofContinuedCourtSupervision
The Board has several well-supported concerns regarding the
continuation of court supervision. According to the statistics
previously presented in Charts 2 and 3, ifcourt supervision continues,
in five to ten years, the East Baton Rouge Parish School System will
consist entirelyofpoor, black children.'98 This will make compliance
with the Consent Decree requirements regarding student assignments
even more onerous. Also, uncertainty about the future of the court's
supervision of the school system is continuously driving more
students away from the public school system.1 99 This includes not
only white middle class flight, but the 2000 and 2001 school years
have indicated an increased black middle class flight from the parish
public school system. 2°°
Another reason school board officials are pushing for unitary
status to be granted is the upcoming election in early 2003 when
school officials will ask East Baton Rouge Parish voters to renew the

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

198. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supranote 131, at slide 27.
199. Id. at slide 25. As aresult of the 2000-2001 enrollment cap dispute, the
school system lost 1704 students in 2000 (1510 white, 194 black) and 1852
students in 2001 (1523 white, 329 black). Id.

200. Id. at slide 24-25. In 2000, 627 white and 533 black students left the
public school system to attend private schools. That same year 160 white and 60
black students opted home schooling as apreferred means ofeducation. This trend
continued in 2001 with 569 white and 409 black students moving to private schools

and 173 white and 6black students choosing to be educated at home. Id.
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one-cent sales tax which expires in 2004.201 This sales tax provides
286 million dollars that is needed to keep improving the school
system and maintain competitive teacher salaries.0 2 School officials
fear that if continued, judicial supervision of the school system will
deter parents who have removed their children from the public school
system due to uncertainty from supporting taxes necessary to run
viable schools for the poorest students in the parish. 3 Additionally,
as long as judicial supervision remains intact, non-education related
compliance costs, such as legal fees and administrative costs, will
continue to plague the taxpayers ofEast Baton Rouge Parish."°
CONCLUSION

The declaration of the East Baton Rouge Public School System
as unitary is no longer a far-fetched hope; it is now an attainable goal
that can be reached quickly and efficiently with the cooperation ofall
interested parties. Returning the school system to the control of the
local authorities will allow the school system to better cater to the
needs of the citizens of East Baton Rouge Parish, eliminate the
School Board's burden of excessive legal fees from its already
limited budget, and alleviate the court's grueling task ofsupervising
the school system's every move. In light of all of the federal
jurisprudence discussed in this note, the East Baton Rouge Parish
School System should be able to attain unitary status and be declared
free from the supervision of the judiciary, putting an end to nearly a
half a century of desegregation litigation and permanently lifting the
fog of confusion that has loomed over the school system for so long.
Jessica E. Watson*

201.

See Sides Mull Last Round ofDeseg Talks, supranote 128.

202. Id.
203. See East Baton Rouge Parish Presentation, supra note 131, at slide 27.
204. Id. at slide 15.
* Recipient of the Vinson & Elkins Best Student Casenote or Comment
Award, 2001-2002. The author extends special thanks to Professor Paul R. Baier,
George M. Armstrong, Jr. Professor ofLaw, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University, for his insight and guidance in the creation of this casenote.
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Chart 5
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